The experience of discrimination
Order Description
Imagine you are in heaven, and the angel in front of you says: “You are going to be born to the world. In America. But guess what? We give you choices. There are some groups in America that are in disadvantaged positions… for example, Blacks. So you can choose to be born White, or you can choose to be born Black with cash compensation. The cash will be deposited to your bank account when you are born.”
Question: If you choose to be born Black in America, how much compensation do you think is reasonable? The more specific the better.
Chapter 11
*
The Experience of
Discrimination
Oh, is there still racism?
-ANONYMOUS STUDENT, ON HEARING THAT A COURSE
ON RACISM WAS BEING OFFERED ON HER CAMPUS,
QUOTED IN TATUM (1997, P. 3)
I don’t think White people, generally, undmtand the
full meaning of racist discriminatory behaviors directed
toward Americans of African descent. They seen1 to see
each act of discrimination or any act of violence as an
“isolated” event. As a result, most White Americans cannot
understand the strong reaction n1anifested by Blacks when such
events occur. They feel that Blacks tend to “overreact.” They
forget that in most cases, we live lives of quiet desperation
generated by a litany of daily large and small events that,
whether or not by design, remind us of our “place”
in American society.
-ANONYMOUS BLACK PROFESSOR, QUOTED IN FEAGIN
AND SIKES (1994, PP. 23-24, EMPHASIS IN ORIGINAL)
Chapter Outline
Social Stigma
What Defines a Stigmatized
Group?
Stigma by Association
Tokenism
418
Responses to Prejudice and
Discrimination
Attributional Ambiguity
personaJ/Group Discrimination
Discrepancy
Consequences of Prejudice to the
Target
Stereotype Threat
Vulnerability to Stress
Threats to Self-Esteem
Coping with Discrimination
Psychological Disengagement and
Disidentification
THE EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION 419
Behavioral Compensation
Summary
Suggested Readings
Key Terms
Questions for Review and Discussion
As we saw in Chapter 6, many White Americans think prejudice is more or
less a thing of the past. It is certainly true that more blatant fonlLS of prejudice
have declined in the United States, because of both legislative and social changes.
It is also true, however, that the existence of prejudice and discrimination can simply
be iuvisible to many members of the majority group. It is sometiules difficult
for the majority group to accept that, for many people, prejudice and discrimination
are a “lived experience” (Feagin & Sikes, 1994, p. 15) and are not inconsequential
beliefs and actions that can siulply be overlooked while “getting on with
one’s life.” Instead, for members of stereotyped groups, these experiences are
woven iuto the fabric of their lives. Much of this book has focused on theories about
and research on prejudiced people. In this chapter, we tell the story of prejudice and
discrimination from the poiut of view of those lived experiences, focusiug on the social
psychological research that describes and explains them.
As we have seen in earlier chapters, prejudice and discrimination can take
many fonns, depending on the actor, the situation, and the historical time period
in which a person lives. These factors similarly affect those who experience prejudice,
creating a dynamic interchange between those who treat others unfairly and
those who are the recipients of this injustice (Dovidio, Major, & Crocker, 2000).
This chapter focuses on the consequences of this exchange as they affect every
aspect of the stigmatized person’s life, including their academic and economic
achievement and their physical and mental well-beiug.
SOCIAL STIGMA
To fully understand what it is like to experience discrimination, it is important to
know what factors set others apart from the dominant group, increasing the likelihood
that they will be discriminated against. Recall from Chapter 1 our discussion
of group privilege. This privilege is defined as membership in the dominant
group, a status that is seen as nonnal and natural and is usually taken for granted
(A. Johnson, 2006). Dominant group membership is sometimes referred to as
majority group membership, but this is somewhat of a misnomer. Privileged status
often comes from being in the majority; however, it is not defined simply by
420 CHAPTER 11
a group’s numerical advantage. For example, the British rule of India lasted more
than 300 years; during that time, Indians faced severe racial discrimination from the
British even though the Indians greatly outnumbered the British (Dirks, 2001),
Similarly, although Blacks in South Africa outnumber Whites four to one, until
1994 Blacks were subjected to apartheid laws that enforced their segregation
from Whites, governed their social life, and limited their employment options
(Beck, 2000), The vestiges of apartheid continue to affect Blacks in South Africa.
Privileged status, then, is defined less by a group’s numbers and more by its power
and influence. We begin our discussion by outlining the factors that delineate a
group’s privileged or disadvantaged status.
What Defines a Stigmatized Group?
~Whether they are consciously aware of it or not, individuals with privileged status
define which groups do or do not share this status. In social psychological tenns,
those groups that do not share this status are stigmatized or deviant. Stigmatized
-groups differ from the privileged or dominant groups in terms of appearance or
behavior. Members of stigmatized groups violate the nOn11.S established by the
dominant group on these dimensions and, as such, are lllarked by the resulting
social stigma (Jones et al., 1984). Because of this, members of stigmatized groups
are sometimes referred to as the marked and those who are the actors, or the ones
who stigmatize, are sometimes referred to as the markers. Marked individuals are
“devalued, spoiled, or flawed in the eyes of others” (Crocker, Major, & Steele,
1998, p. 504). The consequences of this devaluation are fur reaching and can include
dehumanization, threat, aversion, and other negative treatment, including
subtle forms of discrimination (Dovidio et al., 2000).
Which groups are stigmatized by the privileged or dominant group? The
answer depends on the culture and on the historical events that led to the current
cultural context. As we saw in Chapter 1, for example, the Irish and Italians were
once considered non~White and were targets of discrimination in the United
States; today, they are accepted as part of the White majority (Rubin, 1998).
Returning to our earlier examples, India is now governed by its own people and
is not subject to British dominance and Blacks in South Africa have made significant
strides toward undoing the effects of apartheid. Hence, historical events and
changes in laws and social nonns affect cultural beliefS about who can or should be
stigmatized, even if it sometimes takes many years to see their effects. More generally,
dominant group members detennine which individuals are stigmatized, based
on any number of characteristics, including membership in an underrepresented
basic social category, such as ethnicity or old age, or in a socially deviant category
defined by physical or mental disability, weight, socioeconomic status, or sexual
orientation. People also can be stigmatized because of their acne, their mother’s alcoholism,
a speech impediment, or illness, among many other things (Jones et al.,
1984). To be stigmatized, then, individuals must have a characteristic that is devalued
by the dominant group and that sets them apart from that group. Regardless of the
source of the stigma, in all cases, there is shame associated with being nurked
(Goffinan, 1963).
THE EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION 421
As you read this list of stigmatized groups, you might have concluded that
almost everyone has had the experience of being different from the majority and
has suffered because of it. It is true that being different from the group is often part
of normal human life. If you have had such experiences, it may give you some
insight into what it is like to be a member of a stigmatized group. But for majority
group members, nlany times these experiences are short-lived or othenvise benign.
Benign stigmas, such as acne, a correctable speech impediment, or a short-tenn illness,
differ in important ways from the more harmful stigmas social scientists most
often study, such as those based on ethnicity, severe mental illness, or sexual orientation.
Because these latter stigmas typically have more negative consequences,
ranging from depression to extreme violence against the stigmatized group, they
are the focus of this chapter. Edward Jones and his colleagues (1984) have identi–J
fied five dimensions that are particularly helpful in differentiating between harmful
and benign stigmas: course, concealability, aesthetic qualities, origin, and peril.
1.
2.
Course. Benign stigmas are often temporary; that is, the course of the stigma’l
is short. For example, acne is usually outgrown or can be cured by a J
dennatologist. In contrast, the course of many negative stigmas cannot be -J
changed. An individua1’s ethnicity is typically part of his or her lifelong
identity, for example. Another tenn that is sometimes used is stability; some
stigmas are perceived to be stable, or pennanent, whereas others are
perceived to be unstable and so can change over time. In general, people
believe that physica11y based stigmas, such as blindness or cancer, are stable
and that mental-behavioral stigmas, such as drug abuse or obesity, are
unstable (Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). In general, stable stigmas
have more negative consequences for the stigmatized person.
Concealability. Some stigmas are concealable, which means they can be I
hidden or controlled by the stigmatized person. Such stigmas can be avoided J
simply by keeping the stigma private, such as by not ta1king about one’s
alcoholic mother, or can be hidden, such as by wearing makeup to cover a
scar or birthmark. Moreover, some individuals can and do choose to “pass”
for a member of a different ethnic group, thus concealing their group
membership. However, as John Pachankis (2007) explains, concea1ing a
stigma does not reduce the guilt and shame associated with that stigma.
Moreover, the need to continuously monitor behavior so that the stigma
remains undisclosed can be anxiety provoking. fu he notes” [i]n every new
situation that is encountered, such individuals must decide who among the
present company knows of their stigma, who may suspect this stigma, and
who has no suspicion of the stigma” (p. 328). Many gay men and lesbians,
for example, are not open about their relationships out of fear of social
rejection, loss of employment, or the threat of physical violence; as a result
they often find themselves lying about or hiding an important part of their
life and they feel guilt and shame because they must do so (Meyer, 2003).
Similarly, people often fail to seek treatment for menta1 illness because of the
stigma associated with revealing their problem (Corrigan, 2004). People who
have stigmas that cannot be concealed have a different set of problems; they
422 CHAPTER 11
3.
~.
‘
realize their membership in a stigmatized group is apparent and this, in tum,
affects their thoughts, feelings, and behavior. They must always directly
cope with the prejudice and discrimination associated with their group
membership (Crocker et al., 1998).
Aesthetic qualities. Aesthetics refers to what is beautiful or appealing.
As we discussed in Chapter 3, many stereotypes are triggered by physical
appearance cues (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and many stigmas are based on
this dimension as well. In general, less physically attractive people are more
likely to be stigmatized (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991). One
reliable indicator of physical attractiveness is facial symnletty, or the degree
to which the left and right sides of the face are mirror images of each
other (Langlois & Roggman, 1990). Inclividuals with facial disfigurement
typically do not meet this standard and are likely to be stigmatized. In North
American culture, slimness is emphasized and overweight people become
the targets of cliscrimination (Crandall et al., 2001). Similarly, a central
component of the old-age stereotype is a decline in physical attractiveness
and mobility (Slotterback & Saarnio, 1996).
Origin. This tenn refers to how the stigma came to be and whether its
onset was under the control of the stigmatized individual. Stigmas perceived
to be controllable include drug addiction, acquisition of HIV, and obesity;
those perceived to be uncontrollable include cancer and heart disease
(Weiner et al., 1988). Physical characteristics that one is born with, such as
race or many disabilities, also are perceived to be uncontrollable Gones et al.,
1984). People’s beliefs about the controllability of a stigma have important
implications for acceptance of the stigmatized other. When people believe
that a stigma is uncontrollable, they feel nlore pity and less anger toward
the stigmatized individual compared with when the stigma is perceived
as controllable (Dijker & Koomen, 2003; Weiner et al., 1988). This
viewpoint is evident in this excerpt from a letter to the editor that appeared
in the Chronicle Review: “Race is something that a person has no control
over; hence racism is wrong. Homosexuality is a choice a person makes,
and therefore it is not wrong to disagree with it” (Colvin, 2003, p. B4).
Research suggests that others share Colvin’s viewpoint. For example,
Bernard Whitley (1990) found that people who believed that sexual
orientation was controllable had more negative attitudes toward lesbians
and gay men than did people who believed sexual orientation was not
controllable.
Peril. Members of some stigmatized groups are perceived, correctly or
incorrectly, to be dangerous. Persons with a mental illness, for example, are
stereo typically perceived to be dangerous, even though statistically they are
no more likely to commit violent crime than people not so diagnosed
(Corrigan & Penn, 1999). As we saw in Chapter 3, people stereotypically
assume that Blacks are more dangerous than Whites (Duncan, 1976).
Especially in the early years of the AIDS epidemic, the stigma associated
with HIV infection was found to be related to the belief that persons with
THE EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION 423
AIDS were highly contagious and therefore dangerous (Triplet & Sugannan,
1987). In general, groups assumed to be more dangerous are more stigmatized
than groups perceived as less dangerous (Jones et al., 1984).
Stigma by Association
So far, we have discussed what sets individuals apart from the dominant group.
One underlying assumption is that the dominant group generally rejects members
of stigmatized groups. But what happens when a member of the majority
group associates with a stigmatized person? Erving Goflinan (1963) proposed
that such an association would result in a “courtesy stignla” whereby the nlajority
group member would also then be stigmatized. In the past, mainly anecdotal
data supported this possibility. However, recent research suggests that Goffinan’s
hypothesis was correct. For example, Steven Neuberg and his colleagues (Neuberg,
Smith, Hoffman, & Russell, 1994) asked male research participants to watch a
social interaction that they believed was between either two friends or two
strangers. In the course of the conversation, one of the men (Person A) discussed
his relationship as being with either a woman or a man, which also revealed that
he was either heterosexual or gay. Person B, the other man, was presented as
heterosexual. Results supported Goffman’s hypothesis: there was a “courtesy
stigma” or a stigma by association with the gay man. That is, male research participants
were less comfortable with Person B when they believed he was a friend
of, rather than a stranger to, the gay Person A. When Person A was described as
heterosexual, Person B’s evaluations did not depend on how well he knew
Person A. Janet Swim and her colleagues (Swim, Ferguson, & Hyers, 1999)
also found that people fear stigma by association with gay people. In their study,
heterosexual women behaved in ways that socially distanced themselves from a
lesbian, even when doing so required agreeing with socially unpopular positions
or making sexist responses.
Additional research suggests that simply interacting with an obese person can
produce a courtesy stigma. Research participants were less likely to recommend
hiring a job applicant who was shown interacting with an overweight person at a
social gathering, regardless of how well tbe applicant knew the overweight person
(Hebl & Mannix, 2003). Similarly, children as young as 5 years old dislike
girls more when they are pictured next to an overweight rather than an average
weight child. However, this courtesy stigma did not emerge for boys who were
pictured with an overweight boy (Penny & Haddock, 2007). Finally, individuals
who are dating a person with a disability are subject to stigma by association,
including the perception that they are less intelligent and sociable than those
dating a nondisabled person (Goldstein & Johnson, 1997). Yet some aspects of
this stigma by association were positive, including the perception that those dating
the disabled were more nurturant and trustworthy than those not doing so.
Even so, these positive perceptions are consistent with the idea that those associated
with stigmatized others are different. As the authors note, even respondents’
positive comments focused on this difference, pointing out, for example, how
424 CHAPTER 11
much a person had to give up to date someone with a disability. In DUllY cases,
the comnlents indicated sympathy for the nondisabled person. Taken together,
these studies suggest that Goffinan’s idea has merit; there are social consequences
for associating with a deviant.
Tokenism
We noted above that being a numerical minority is not, in and of itself, sufficient
to produce stigmatized status. That is, power and status are important cOlnponents
of defining privilege and nonprivilege. This does not mean, however,
that being in the minority produces no negative effects, particularly in certain
situations or settings. That is, one can be in the majority or near majority in a
larger population, but still have stigmatizing experiences from being a minority
within a particular context. Women, for example, are now represented in the
labor force at numbers nearly equal to men. Many, however, still have negative
experiences that result from being in the minority in some environments, such as
[
being the only woman in a particular work group (Yoder, 2002). When individuals
are a statistical minority within a particular setting, they can be treated as
tokens and can be stigmatized because of it. In general, token status occurs when
there is a preponderance of one group over another, such as when one gender or
ethnicity is in the majority and only a few individuals fronl another gender
or ethnicity are represented (Kanter, 1977).
Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977) pioneered the research on tokenism in her case
-‘stUdY of a multinational Fortune 500 corporation. Kanter highlighted three perceptual
tendencies that affected the daily lives of tokens: visibility, contrast, and
assimilation. Visibility refers to the ,tendency for tokens to get attention or, as she
put it, “capture a larger awareness share” (p. 210). Consider, for example, this vi-
sual field containing a series of 9 XS and ouly 1 0:
XXXXXXXOXX
Notice that your eyes tend to be drawn toward the 0 and not to any individual
X. As we saw in Chapter 3, the perceptual process is similar in social situations;
people’s attention also tends to be drawn to the novel or unique person
rather than to members of the majority group (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Members
of the minority, or token group, are slll1ply noticed more than are other group
[.
members. Contrast refers to the polarization or exaggeration of differences between
the token and the dominant group. A White person in a group conlprised
‘. only of Whites, for example, might not think much about her or his racial identity.
The presence of a Black person, however, brings race to the forefront, raising awareness
of race for members of the dominant group. Similarly, adding a woman to an
all-male work group can raise awareness of gender issues. Often, both dominant and
[
Oken group members are uncomfortable when this happens. Assimilation occurs
when the token is stereotyped; in particular, the token’s characteristics are distorted
so that she or he fits the expected stereotype. A group of men, then, notice when a
-token woman behaves in a way that confinns their stereotypes about women and
THE EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION 425
often generalize from that confinnation. However, the same men tend not to notice
when the woman’s behavior does not confonn to their gender stereotypes.
These perceptual tendencies have important consequences for the token,
which Kanter (1977) illustrated with examples from her case study. She found,
for example, that whenever token women did something unusual, it stood out.
As she describes it “[t]hey were the subject of conversation, questioning, gossip,
and careful scrutiny … Their names came up at meetings, and they would easily
be used as examples … [S]01ne women were even told by their managers that
they were watched more closely than the men” (p. 212). This was a doubleedged
sword; their achievements were noticed, but so were their mistakes.
And, their actions were seen as representative of a11 women, not just of
themselves as individuals. Consequently, evel1 small decisions, such as what to
wear to a business meeting, became important. Most people find such situations
difficult to navigate, as the additional examples provided in Box 11.1 illustrate.
Tokens often feel isolated but, at the same time, must go on as if the differences
do not exist and do not affect their work. Solos, or people who are the only
minority member in a majority group, often feel alone and without support
(Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). As one Black woman wrote, “the responsibility
associated with being the ouly Black female in my college and only one of a
handful in the university, was overwhelming. I have suffered several instances of
burn-out and exhaustion. & a consequence I have learned to maintain a less
visible profile as a coping and survival strategy” (Moses, 1989, p. 15). All told,
the negative effects of being in the minority can create what has been ca11ed the
“chilly climate” (Sandler & Hail, 1986). Tokens do not feel welcome or supported
in their environment and often their work and personal lives suffer
because of it.
Although Kanter (1977) defined token status as simply being in the numerical
minority, more recent work suggests numbers alone do not define token
status. For example, women who pursue nontraditional occupations are more likely
to experience the effects of tokenism than are women in traditional occupations
(Yoder, 2002). A survey of undergraduates, for exanlple, found that women in
male-dominated academic areas, such as math, science, and engineering, reported
higher levels of current sex discrimination than did women in female-dominated
academic areas, such as the arts, education, and social science (see Figure 11.1;
J. Steele, James, & Barnett, 2002). However, men’s perceptions of current sex discrimination
were not affected by their area of study. This pattern also emerged in a
measure of whether sex discrimination was expected in the future; women in maledominated
professions were most likely to hold this expectation and were most
likely to consider changing their major. As we discussed in Chapter 10, men in
female-dominated occupations, such as nursing and social work, rarely have the
same negative experiences as women in male-dominated professions and may even
be on the fast track to promotion (Maume, 1999; WillianlS, 1992), although there
may be exceptions in some settings. For example, Susan Murray (1997) found that
male child-care workers were pushed away from performing tasks that requITe
nurturing and received the clear message that child care was women’s work. These
426 CHAPTER 11
What does happen to the deviate? The deviate
can convert, but short of a sex change operation,
a time machine to age me, and a personality
overhaul, conversion seems out of the question
for me. Be isolated? That originally was all right
with me, but that surely does not make me a team
member. What can I do? Yet, the failure is placed
squarely on my shoulders. “What is wrong with
you?” “Why can’t you get along?” These
questions haunt me, undermining my self-image.
-JAN YODER (1985, p. 67)
It is difficult to document exactly what form a token’s
negative experiences might take. That is, the actual
events that comprise those experiences are very
personalized. Moreover, many of the individual instances
that lead to the isolation and loneliness experienced by
tokens seem harmless on the surface, especially to those
who are not directly living with them. As you read the
personal accounts described in this chapter, they too may
seem harmless. Keep in mind, however, that the research
evidence suggests that, over time, such experiences
affect those in token roles by isolating them from the
dominant group, lowering their self-esteem, and creating
loneliness (Sue et aI., 2007). As a respondent in Paula
Caplan’s (1994) survey of women in academe described,
their cumulative impact is similar to “lifting a ton of
feathers” (p. 9). Over time, their weight ‘IS unbearable.
This weight is illustrated by the opening quote in
this box, which came from Jan Yoder’s (1985) first
person account of being the first female civilian faculty
member at a United States military academy. Her
writings captured her dilemma about howto respond to
her interactions with the military officers who comprised
97 percent of the faculty. As she notes in her account,
no one event seemed overly traumatic. Yet, because of
their cumulative impact, she stayed only six months.
Here are a few of her experiences:
Because she openly questioned the sexism of
some exam questions, she was given a suggestion book
so she could quietly record her objections without
disrupting faculty meetings.
Her department chose to use “Macho Man” as its
theme song, a song few women would choose to
represent themselves.
Gossip about her ranged from “she’s a lesbian” to
“she is heterosexual, but promiscuous.”
Despite her efforts to clarify her position in the
academy, at social gatherings it was widely assumed
that she was the wife of one of the officers.
” ..
…. …. …’ .” :
.’ .•.• … ……….. …. ·<i
Jan Yoder is now a highly successful faculty
member at the University of Akron. Her study of Black
women firefighters (Yoder, 1997) shows how the
experience of being a token can threaten the safety of
both the firefighters and those they are protecting.
One Black woman in her study reported that, in
response to a request for help, she received no
constructive information, but instead was written up
for presumed negligence. A coworker directly told
another Black woman that when there was a fire, she
was not to touch anything, but rather to stay out of
the way. Many of the women reported receiving the
“silent treatment,” with the men literally walking out
of the room when they entered. One reported that,
during her formal testing, she was required to hoist a
hose onto a shelf that suddenly had been raised five
inches above where it was during training.
One of the ways tokens can be made to feel
alienated is through the conversations majority group
members initiate with them. Black managers, for
example, express frustrations with queries that seem to
hold them accountable for other Blacks’ behaviors,
such as “Why do all the Blacks sit together?” and the
relative lack of discussion about business-related topics,
such as how to make the company succeed (Caver &
Livers, 2002). Blacks often feel invisible as well.
Anderson Franklin (2004) describes the experience of a
successful Black manager who took a White business
client out for dinner in New York City. The maitre d’
ignored the Black manager, instead asking the White
client if he had reservations. And, after dinner, the
waiter returned the Black manager’s credit card to the
White client. After dinner, the White client easily
found a cab, but the Black manager was ignored
by cabdrivers for over 15 minutes, even as other
Whites successfully hailed a cab. Echoing the
sent’lments expressed by others ‘In this chapter, at the
individual level, such actions may seem harmless to
dominant group members, but to tokens “[ilt’s the
cumulative effect that wears us down” (Caver & Livers,
2002, p. 78).
Many others have written about these individualized
experiences. Researchers look across such events and,
based on patterns, draw conclusions about the short- and
long-term effects of being a token. On a positive note,
research suggests that when the group composition
changes so that, for example, several women become part
of an otherwise male-dominated group, these negative
experiences dissipate and job satisfaction improves
(Niemann & Dovidio, 1998).
2
1.5
0.5
o
Male dominated
academic area
THE EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION 427
Female dominated
academic area
II1II Women
Men
FIG U R E 11.1 Perceived Current Sex Discrimination by Gender of Respondent and
Academic Area
Female undergraduates in a male-dominated academic area reported higher levels of sex
discrimination than did female undergraduates in a female-dominated academic area or
male undergraduates in either academic area.
SOURCE: Adapted from Steele, James, and Barnett (2002).
men reported feeling under suspicion, especially about their sexual motives for
choosing a career in child care.
The majority of the research on tokenism has focused on women who
occupy nontraditional roles and remain the minority in those roles. Only a few
studies have examined the experiences of people of color (see Moses, 1989, for
one example). Jan Yoder (1997) studied the experience of Black women who
were training to be firefighters; these women were a double minority in that
setting, She found that their efforts sometimes were directly sabotaged by their
superiors and coworkers (see Box 11.1), Additional factors, such as one’s status
in an organization, also may affect one’s experience as a minority. Mary Kite
and Deborah Balogh (1997) found that untenured women faculty were more
likely than untenured nlen to report the kinds of negative interactions that are
typically associated witb the chilly climate, such as being excluded from social
events or having their comments ignored at meetings. Tenured women and
men did not differ in their reports about negative interactions, even though,
at that time, both tenured and untenured women were a statistical minority
at their university. This may be because their secure status or their experience
in the environment provided tenured women with a buffer from the effects of
tokenism.
428 CHAPTER 11
RESPONSES TO PREJUDICE AND
DISCRIMINATION
The personal experiences and experimental research we described in Chapter 10
provide a snapshot of the many and varied forms prejudice and discrimination
can take. We focus here on how these behaviors affect stigmatized group members.
The effects can be viewed on a continuum. At one end of the continuum
are discriminatory behaviors that can make stigmatized group members uncomfortable;
at the other end of the continuum are behaviors that cause menlbers of
stigmatized groups to lose job opportunities and that can affect their health and
well-being. Social psychologists have documented that stigmatizing experiences
can create uncertainty for m_embers of stigmatized groups, especially in how
to interpret interactions with members of the dominant group. We tum to this
research next.
Attributional Ambiguity
Most people find it difficult to talk directly about stereotyping and prejudice.
When members of dominant and stigm_atized groups interact, the topic of prejudice
can become the proverbial “elephant in the room.” Recall from our discussion
above, for exalnple, that when tokens are present, it increases the likelihood
the majority group members will think about their own group membership,
even if they do not discuss this awareness. In these situations, both dominant
and minority group members can become uncomfortable. One cause of this discomfort
is the ambivalent attitudes that dominant group mem_bers often hold
toward stigmatized groups. People who are not disabled, for example, often report
feelings of both sympathy and anger toward those who are (Dijker & Koomen,
2003; Fichten & Arnsel, 1986). Similarly, Whites often hold ambivalent attitudes
about Blacks, viewing the group positively on sonle dilllensions and negatively on
others (Czopp & Monteith, 2006). Moreover, as we discussed in Chapter 6, what
people are willing to say about stigmatized groups has changed; in the United
States, people today are much more accepting of the principle of equality for all
people and most people want to avoid the appearance of being prejudiced. This
does not mean, however, that prejudiced attitudes have disappeared.
Members of stigmatized groups are well aware of these mixed reactions. This
awareness leads to a situation that Jennifer Crocker, Brenda Major, and their
colleagues (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991) refer to as attributional
ambiguity. That is, members of stigmatized groups often find it difficult to interpret
feedback from dominant group members. Although such feedback may
-e based on the stigmatized group member’s actual ability or achievement, it also
may be based on feelings of sympathy or pity or on the desire on the part of the
Qominant group member to appear unbiased. Research shows, for example, that
Whites sometimes give more positive feedback to Blacks than to Whites for the
same poor performance, perhaps to avoid the appearance of being prejudiced
“(Harber, 1998; see also Chapter 6). Questions arise, then; for example, a Black
THE EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION 429
person might wonder whether his supervisor’s evaluation reflects his competence
or stems from the supervisor’s biases and prejudices. The answer to this question
is unclear, leaving the stigmatized person unsure about how to interpret the
feedback.
Crocker and her colleagues (1991) demonstrated the effects of attributional ambiguity
in a study that was supposedly about ftiendship development. Participants
were paired -with a White student in an adjoining room who was actually a confederate
of the experimenter. To manipulate whether the confederate knew the
participant’s race, either the blinds were drawn between the two rooms (so the
participant could not be seen) or they were not. The participants described
their likes and dislikes on a form that was allegedly shown to the confederate.
Next, participants received bogus feedback indicating that the other person had
either a positive or negative reaction to the information. When the other person
could not see them, Black participitants were more likely to attribute negative
than positive feedback to prejudice. In contrast, when Blacks knew their
partner could see them, they atttibuted both the positive and negative feedback
to prejudice. White participants’ attributions to prejudice were unaffected by
the valence of the feedback or by whether their partner knew their race.
These results suggest that stigmatized group members sometimes discouf}.t feedback
from the majority group because they believe it is based on factors other
than their ability or performance (Crocker & Major, 2003).
Members of stigmatized groups do not always discount positive feedback,
however, and instead may augment it, or conclude that the positive evaluation
was due to their own deservingness. In one study, for example, unattractive people
found positive feedback to be more believable than did attractive people in a
similar situation, perhaps because the unattractive participants did not think their
partner had ulterior motives-in this case, an other-sex attraction toward them.
Attractive people, in contrast, may have assumed attraction played a role and, as
such, discounted the feedback (Major, Carrington, & Carnevale, 1984). When
ulterior motives are not suspected, then, people are more likely to conclude
that the feedback is due to their abilities or characteristics, but when such
motives are suspected, members of stigmatized groups do not believe the positive
feedback and conclude that it was due to factors such as the evaluators’ desire to
appear unbiased or to their sympathy or pity.
What are the psychological consequences of receiving unclear feedback?
Research shows that such consequences depend on whether stigmatized group
members augment or discount the feedback and on the valence of the feedback.
Discounting negative feedback, for example, has self-protective consequences. In
the Crocker and colleagues (1991) study described above, Black participants who
could attribute negative feedback to prejudice were less depressed than those
who could not. In contrast, discounting positive feedback tends to produce
lower self-esteem, even when compared to those individual., who received negative
feedback (Crocker et al., 1991). However, atttibuting negative feedback to
prejudice is not always beneficial; stigmatized group members who frequendy see
themselves as a victim of prejudice in many situations have lower self-esteem
(Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999), a point
430 CHAPTER 11
we return to later in this chapter. Moreover, individuals who strongly identify as
members of their social group do not psychologically benefit from attributing
negative feedback to prejudice (McCoy & Major, 2003).
Interestingly, both stigmatized and dominant group Inel11bers are aware that
people are likely to consider another’s racial group menlbership when evaluating
thein. For example, Bruce Blaine and his colleagues (Blaine, Crocker, & Major,
1995) asked undergraduates to put themselves in the shoes of Blacks or women
and imagine how they would feel if they were offered a job for one of two
reasons: they were qualified for the job or the employer felt sympathy for past
discrimination against their group. Participants who imagined the job offer was
motivated by sympathy reported that they would have lower self-esteem, higher
depression, 1110re hostility, and lower motivation than those who imagined the
job offer was based on their qualifications. Follow-up studies showed that these
effects were quite general. For example, similar patterns emerged regardless of
whether the employer felt sympathy because of enlployment discrimination specifically
or felt sympathy for the stigmatized group in general, in this case people
with disabilities (Blaine et al., 1995). Research also has found that both Whites
and Latinos who portrayed Latinos in a virtual world discounted negative feedback
about their performance lllore than those who portrayed Whites in this
virtual world (Hoyt, Aguilar, Kaiser, Blascovich, & Lee, 2007).
Interestingly, self-esteenl can be affected even if the stigmatized group member
does not blame the evaluator for the negative feedback (Crocker, Cornwell,
& Major, 1993). Overweight women who received negative social feedback from
a male evaluator were more likely to attribute the negative feedback to their
weight than were normal-weight WOlllen, but did not dislike the evaluator for
providing this feedback. That is, they did not attribute his feedback to prejudice.
Even so, the overweight women who received negative feedback reported being
in a lllore negative mood, and reported higher levels of depression and anxiety
than did normal-weight women who received negative feedback or women of
any weight who received positive feedback. Overweight women are not getting
a boost to their self-esteem, but instead may shoulder the blame for their weight.
This may have harmful consequences. For example, the overweight may conclude
that they will fail at dieting or following an exercise program and therefore
not try or give up too easily. If, instead, the overweight had benefited from this
buffer, they might be more willing to try and succeed in these endeavors.
In summary, research on attributional anlbiguity shows that stigmatized people
consider the source when receiving feedback and, if they believe the source is
prejudiced against them, weigh that feedback differently. When the feedback is
negative and can be attributed to prejudice they discount it. They also sonletimes
discount positive feedback because they doubt its validity, believing instead it
stemmed from the evaluator’s ulterior lllotives. Other times, for example when
ulterior motives are not suspected, stigmatized individuals augment the positive
feedback, deciding it must be due to their ability or characteristics. For minorities,
discounting negative feedback has beneficial effects on self-esteem, but discounting
positive feedback does not. Overweight women, however, do not gain
a psychological benefit from attributing negative feedback to prejudice.
THE EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION 431
Personal/Group Discrimination Discrepancy’
You have no doubt heard about serendipitous research findings that were at first
puzzling but later led to important new theories and research. Faye Crosby
(1984) stumbled across just such a phenomenon when she surveyed working
women who lived in a Boston suburb. Objective indicators showed that these
women were being discriminated against; for example, the women earned between
$5,000 and $8,000 less than men for equivalent jobs. Yet Crosby also
found that the women were just as satisfied with their job as the men were.
Perhaps even more puzzling was that the women were well aware that sex discrimination
existed in the United States and, moreover, they were aggrieved by
this state of affairs. They just did not believe this discrimination was happening in
their own lives.
Crosby’s (1984) surprising finding has led to a great deal of research on Wha~’]
is now known as the personal/group discrimination discrepancy (PGDD),
people’s belief that their group, as a whole, is 1110re likely to be discriminated
against than they, themselves, are as individuals (Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam,
& Lalonde, 1990). Researchers have reported findings consistent with this hypothesis
vvith groups as diverse as Black college activists, French Canadians in Quebec,
Canada (who live in a largely English-speaking country), English-speaking residents
of Quebec (where French is the dominant language), unemployed workers
in Australia, and lesbians (see reviews by Crosby, Pufal1, Snyder, O’Connell, &
Whalen, 1989 and Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994), Figure 11.2 illustrates the
pattern the PGDD generally follows; lesbians perceived higher levels of discrimination
for their group at a national and a local level than for themselves, They also
believed lesbians at the local level and the national level had a greater need to hide
their sexual orientation at work than they themselves did (Crosby et al., 1989).
Cognitive Explanations. There are two main categories of explanations fO~-]
the PGDD: cognitive and motivational. Proponents of cognitive explanations
suggest the personal/group discrimination discrepancy is simply a function of the
way people process information. For example, Faye Crosby and her colleagues
(Crosby, Clayton, Alksnis, & Hemker, 1986) found that when participants evaluated
information about discrimination in the aggregate form (that is, they read
about patterns of discrimination compiled over several individuals), they believed
that discrimination occurred. But when the same information was presented on a
case by case basis, they failed to perceive discrimination. Hence, the way in which
the infonnation was presented and processed either produced or inhibited the
perception of discrimination. Research also has demonstrated that the PGDD is
quite general, applying to domains unrelated to discrimination, such as the economy
and the threat of A1DS (Moghaddam, Stolkin, & Hutcheson, 1997). People
believe, for eXaIllple, that a good economy is more likely to benefit their group as
a whole than them as individuals. Such findings suggest a general process is operating
that extends beyond perceptions of discrimination. It may be that the
PGDD emerges because group examples more readily come to mind than do individual
examples or because group information is more easily processed than is
432 CHAPTER 11
6
5
4
3
2
Perceptions of
discrimination
II National
!iii Local
Personal
Need to maintain
a heterosexual faQade
FIG U R E 11.2 Lesbians’ Ratings of Perceived Discrimination at the Personal, Local,
and National Level
Lesbian respondents saw more evidence of discrimination at the local level than at the
personal level and the highest level of discrimination at the national level. They also
believed lesbians at the local level and the national level had a greater need to hide
their sexual orientation at work by appearing heterosexual than they themselves did.
SOURCE: Adapted from Crosby, Pufall, Snyder, O’Connell, and Whalen (1989).
infonnation about the sell. Supporting this possibility, research shows that the
PGDD is found for perceptions of positive events as well as negative events; people
believe, for example, that the group, overall, is more likely than they, as individuals,
to have warn’! and supportive friends or to benefit from the improved
efficiency of computers (Moghaddam et al., 1997).
~ Another cognitive-based explanation is that people are using different comparison
standards when judging their own versus the group’s level of discrimination.
That is, when deciding about their personal experience with discrimination,
people consider their experiences in comparison with their own group melnbers,
but when deciding about the groups’ discrinrinatory experiences, they compare
themselves to other groups (Taylor et al., 1994), Women, then, may believe that
they, personally, are better off than most won’!en, but that their group is doing
worse, on the whole, than men are. If this is the case, making the referent group
explicit should reduce the PGDD. Research supports this possibility (Quinn,
Roese, Pennington, & Olson, 1999). Ratings made in the absence of a referent
led people to use ingroup comparisons for judgments of personal discrimination
and outgroup comparisons for judgments of group discrimination. Moreover,
providing a specific referent to an ingroup, in this case by asking women to
compare their personal level of discrinunation to other women’s, reduced the
PGDD. Perceptions of how often discriminatory acts occur also affects the PGDD;
THE EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION 433
women see a smaller PGDD for discriminatory acts thought to occur frequently in
the workplace, such as being told to act in feminine ways, com-pared to events
thought to occur infrequently, such as not receiving the same raise as their male
colleagues (Fuegen & Biernat, 2000).
Taken as a whole, these studies show that the way people process infonnation
in general, and about discrimination specifically, affects their views about
their own and their group’s experience with discrimination. It should be noted,
however, that neither making the referent group explicit nor including information
about frequency or severity of discrimination completely eliminates the
PGDD. For example, making the referent explicit by asking women to compare
their level of discrimination specifically to men’s does not reduce the PGDD
(Quinn et al., 1999). Coguitive explanations tell us something, but not everything,
about why the PGDD occurs (Taylor et al., 1994).
Motivational Explanations. Motivational explanations assume that peOPle~]
have reasons for believing that they are not personally discriminated against,
even while recognizing that their group is. The motivational explanation that
has received the most support is Crosby and colleagues’ (1986) hypothesis that
people want to deny or minirnize their own experiences with discrimination.
Recall from our earlier discussion that, in Crosby’s studies (Crosby, 1984;
Crosby et al., 1986), people reported little personal experience with discrimination,
even though by objective indicators discrimination existed. There are
several reasons why individuals might deny their personal experiences with discrimination
(Taylor et aI., 1994). In some instances, individuals might take personal
responsibility for their situation, and thus not acknowledge that the poor
treatment they received could be due to discrimination. In other instances, people
deny discrimination to justify their failure to accuse a specific discriminator or
their decision not to take action against the unfair treatment. Finally, people may
view their own situation as relatively hannless compared to more dramatic examples
of discrimination, particularly those highlighted in the mass media.
Mauricio Carvallo and Brett Pelham (2006) have proposed another reasoD.Jpeople
deny personal discrimination: they have a strong need to affiliate and
bond with other people. These authors note that stigmatized group members
often are discriminated against by people with whon1 they have meaningful relationships,
such as mends and coworkers. Therefore, acknowledging this discrimination
would mean also acknowledging that they do not fit in with their
social group. Consistent with this perspective, Carvallo and Pelham found that
people who have a high need to belong were more likely to believe that their
group experiences discrimination but were less likely to believe that they personally
are discriminated against. They also found that when people were made to
feel accepted by their group, they were more likely to acknowledge personal
discrimination than were individuals in a control condition.
People also can recognize the social costs of claiming discrimination and, as a
result, try to avoid those costs by not making claims of unfairness (Kaiser & Miller,
2001a). The social costs of claiming discrimination include being viewed negatively
by members of the dominant group, such as being labeled a whiner or someone
434 CHAPTER 11
who takes advantage of possible discrimination for personal gain (Feagin & Sikes,
1994). To see if such outcomes occur, Cheryl Kaiser and Carol Miller (2001a)
asked introductory psychology students to read a description of a Black student
who failed a test that had been scored by one of eight White judges. The potential
bias he faced was lluuipulated: either none, four, or all of these White judges
reportedly had a history of discriminating against Blacks. The research participants
learned of this possible discrimination and that the student had failed the
test. They also learned that the Black student attributed his failure to either the
quality of rus answers or to discrimination. Regardless of how much possible
prejudice he had faced, participants were more likely to label the student as a
complainer and to evaluate him less favorably when he nude attributions to discrimination
rather than ability. Interestingly, however, the student who attributed
his failure to discrimination also was seen as truer to himself than the
student who attributed his failure to abiliry.
Additional research suggests that m_embers of stigmatized groups are aware of
such perceptions and this awareness affects their decision to report or confront
discrimination. Women and Blacks who received a failing grade on a creativity
test, for example, were more likely to attribute the failure to discrimination
when reporting their attributions anonymously or when their explanation would
be seen only by a stigmatized group member, compared to when the explanation
would be seen by a dominant group member (Stangor, Swim, Van Alien, &
Sechrist, 2002). For mem_bers of nonstigmatized groups, attributions were unaffected
by who would see the results. The stakes of the encounter matter, too.
Nicole Shelton and Rebecca Stewart (2004), for example, found that women
who were being interviewed for a competitive, high paying job were less likely
to confront a male interviewer who asked sexist questions than were women
who were being interviewed for a low paying, less competitive job. This awareness
also may playa role iu the PGDD; supporting the idea that members of
stigmatized groups want to distance themselves frOlU negative attributes associated
with their group, Gordon Hodson and Victoria Esses (2002) found that
women were more likely to think that negative attributes (including being the
target of discrimination) applied to the ingroup than to themselves, suggesting
that they wanted to distinguish themselves from the group on these attributes.
However, this distancing was not found for positive attributes; instead, they
were nlore likely to report that positive attributes applied to themselves than to
the ingroup. These effects were luore pronounced for women who strongly
identified with their group and, therefore, were luore invested in how they
and their group were perceived.
Perceiving Discrimination. It would be incorrect to conclude, however, that
people never recognize that they are personally being discrinrinated against. Donald
Taylor and his colleagues (1990) found that both Haitian and Indian iumligrants to
Canada reported significant personal experience with discrimination, even though
they believed that their group experienced more discrimination, as a whole, than
they did as individuals. Sinrilarly, single mothers receivillg government assistance
reported feeling that their lives were sonlewhat unfair and evidenced resentment
THE EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION 435
toward their situation, but still believed themselves to be better off than other
mothers in their situation (Olson, Roese, Meen, & Robertson, 1995). There also
may be individual differences in the tendency to minimize one’s own experience
with discrimination; the more typical of their group that Iranians perceived themselves
to be, the less likely they were to exhibit the personal/group discrimination
discrepancy (Verkuyten & Nekuee, 2001). Similarly, Don Operario and Susan
Fiske (2001, Study One) found that non-Whites who were low and high identifiers
with their group reported equal amounts of discrimination directed at their group,
but differed in their perceptions of personal discrimination: high identifiers were
more likely to report discrimination directed at themselves than were low identifiers.
Results of a second study (Operatio & Fiske, 2001, Study Two), suggest that
this pattern emerged because high identified minorities are more sensitive to possible
discrimination and, therefore, react to both subtle and obvious indicators of
prejudice, whereas those less highly identified reacted ouly to obviously prejudiced
actions. That is, those who identifY strongly with their group may simply be more
likely to notice and react to subtle fonus of prejudice.
Interestingly, research suggests that this heightened sensitivity might he
counterproductive. Elizabeth Pinel (2002) found that women who were high
in stigma consciousness-that is, who believe that they live in a stereotyped world
and that this affects their interactions with outgroups-were more critical of men
who they believed to be sexist. This criticism, in tum, elicited more negative
criticism from those men. The end result was that the women concluded that
they were incompatible with the sexist men. No such effects emerged for
women low in stigma consciousness or for women who believed they were interacting
with nonsexist nlen. It is important to note that these results emerged
independently of the men’s actual sexist beliefs; the experimenter controlled
who was described as sexist. Therefore, the differences in ratings were due to
the women’s expectations and how the interaction was affected by them, and
not to sexist behavior on the men’s part.
It may seem that there is a contradiction between the studies on attributional
ambiguity, described above, which suggests that members of stigmatized groups
are well aware that they personally might be discriminated against because of
their stigmatized status and the PGDD, which suggests that people deny personal
discrimination. As often happens in social science, bodies of literature address
questions in different ways, resulting in seemingly subtle differences that account
for such contradictions. In this case, studies of attributional ambiguity focus on a
single, specific, instance of discrimination, whereas the personal/group discrepancy
focuses on broad patterns of perceived discrimination. For example, studies
of attributional ambiguity that focus on one interaction show that attributions to
prejudice can protect self-esteem. This protection is not evident when individuals
make attributions to broader, more stahle patterns of discrimination; that
is, when they consider, overall, how prejudice affects them as an individual, people
report that their psychological well-being is adversely affected (Branscombe
et al., 1999). But, as we saw with the personal/group discrimination discrepancy,
they still may believe these effects are worse for their group than for themselves.
436 CHAPTER 11
We have more to say about the effects of experiencing discrimination on mental
health later in this chapter.
CONSEQUENCES OF PREJUDICE TO THE TARGET
During the 1990s, there;were impressive increases in minority group members’
and women’s participation in undergraduate and graduate education. Women,
for example, are now lllore likely to enroll in college than are men and Blacks
and Hispanics are enrolling in record llU1ubers. These gains, however, do not necessarily
translate into greater academic achievement for these groups. Minority student
attrition rates are higher than Whites’ at both the graduate and undergraduate
level, and both women and minorities continue to be underrepresented in science
and engineering (National Science Foundation, 2002). Moreover, college
entrance exam scores continue to differ by sex and ethnicity. Boys, for example,
score higher than girls on the math section of the SAT and Whites score
higher on both the math and verbal sections than do Blacks and Latinos
(College Board, 2003).
One explanation that has been offered for these differences is that women and
minmities are not as able or as well prepared as their White male counterparts
(Benbow & Stanley, 1980; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). Yet, abundant evidence refutes
this clalill. For example, when women and minorities participate in programs
designed specifically for underrepresented groups, they can and do succeed (Fullilove
& Triesman, 1990; Grinnnett, Bliss, & Davis, 1998). Moreover, research indicates that
girls receive higher grades in math courses than do boys (Kimball, 1995) and that
males’ math advantage may be limited to certain types of standardized tests. Scores
on high school achievement tests in 10 U.S. states, for exam-ple, showed no gender
different in scores on the math portion of the exam (Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis, &
Williams, 2008). Hence, the accuracy of the stereotypic belief that wonlen and minorities
are less capable than men or White students is highly suspect, As we will discuss in
the next section, situational factors have an important influence on the success of individuals
who are underrepresented in a specific discipline (such as women in math
and science) or in an academic setting more generally (such as Blacks at most colleges
and universities).
Stereotype Threat
If situational factors can raise the achievement of women and minorities, can
they also hinder their performance? Research evidence suggests that they can.
Consider, for exalllple, that Blacks are well aware that a negative stereotype
exists about their academic abilities. According to Claude Steele (1997), this
knowledge produces a “threat in the air” (p. 617). Blacks realize that they can
be judged or treated in terms of this negative stereotype and can be fearful of
confirming that judgment. If this fear is strong enough and also is personally
relevant to the stereotyped group member, it can create a stereotype threat
THE EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION 437
that interferes with academic achievement (Aronson, Quinn, & Spencer, 1998).
As we will see, this phenomenon can affect a person’s behavior even though no’–”
discriminatory actions actually were directed toward her or him.
In one of the first demonstrations that stereotype threat affects Blacks’
achievement, Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson (1995) asked Black and White
undergraduates to take a test composed of the most difficult verbal questions
from the Graduate Record Exam (GRE). Half of the participants were told the
test was diagnostic of intellectual ability (the diagnostic condition); the other half
were told the test was simply a laboratory problem-solving task (the nondiagnostic
condition). Steele and Aronson proposed that the diagnostic condition induced
stereotype threat for Blacks because their exam performance could support or refute
the stereotype that Blacks have low verbal ability. Supporting tills hypothesi” in
two separate studies, Black participants in the diagnostic condition scored lower
than Blacks in the nondiagnostic condition or Whites in either condition. Figure
11.3 presents these results for the number of items solved correcdy, collapsed across
Studies One and Two. Results of a third study showed that Blacks who were told
the test was diagnostic also were more likely to complete word fragments in terms of
the social stereotype of Blacks (for example, completing __ Z Y as LAZY) than were
Blacks who participated in the nondiagnostic condition, or Whites in either condition.
Similarly, compared with their peers in other conditions, Blacks in the diagnostic
condition were more likely to complete word fragments in a way that indicated
self-doubt (for example, completing L a ___ as LOSER) and were more likely to
distance themselves from stereotypically Black activities, such as liking jazz or basketball.
Because these tasks were completed before the actual diagnostic test was taken,
~
12
In
~ 10
“C * 8 ~
‘6”
.!.
“.C. 6 Black participants
~
0 ‘” 4 ‘” • White participants
E
~
..c.. 2 ;:;;
0
Diagnostic Nondiagnostic
FIGURE 11.3 Mean Items Solved by Participant Race and Test Diagnosticity
Blacks’ performance on a test of verbal ability were affected by whether the test was
described as diagnostic, and thus produced stereotype threat, or nondiagnostic
(nonthreatening). White’s performance was unaffected by how the test was described.
These scores are adjusted for overall verbal ability, as measured by the SAT.
SOURCE: Adapted from Steele and Aronson (1995) Studies One and Two.
438 CHAPTER 11
these findings suggest that the mere expectation of taking a potentially stereotypecon£
nning test brought up stereo typic thoughts, self-doubt, and a desire to be seen
as different from the Black stereotype.
General Features of Stereotype Threat. There are several keys to unders
